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ABSTRACT: This paper discusses an example of social policy argumentation from an opinion of the 2007
majority among the German National Ethics Council (NEC 2007). It is employed to problematize argument
reconstruction with respect to the Informal Logic quality criteria relevance, sufficiency, acceptability (RSA)
(Johnson & Blair 2006, 11977). The main thesis is conditional and rather weak: If the RSA criteria are substitutes for the notion of soundness, then—next to premise-truth and validity—they also substitute reconstructive charity.

1. INTRODUCTION
This paper discusses an example of social policy argumentation from an opinion of the
2007 majority among the German National Ethics Council (NEC 2007). It is employed to
problematize argument reconstruction with respect to the Informal Logic quality criteria:
relevance, sufficiency, acceptability (RSA) (Johnson & Blair 2006, 11977).
The example is an artefact of the debate on human embryonic stem cell research
(hESCR) in Germany, where a comparatively restrictive legal compromise had been
adopted in 2002. Parliamentary vote established a cut-off date for the legal import of
hES-cells. In like mode, the date shifted ahead, and sanctions were clarified, in March
2008.
After providing a brief background to the debate (section 2), the NEC example is
introduced (section 3), comprising altogether three positions: ‘revision of status quo’
(majority) (3.1), ‘either status quo or open debate’ (3.2) and ‘update within status quo’
(3.3). Summarizing the structure of the majority opinion (3.4), we locate new information
relative to 2002 (3.5). This is argued to provide the majority’s reason for changing the
status quo (3.6). We suggest evaluating the majority’s argumentation internally, i.e.,
under the self-professed constraint of ‘not questioning either the stem cell law or embryo
protection law’ (3.6).
Section 4 offers a detailed reconstruction of a crucial section of the majority
opinion (4.1). The sparseness of argumentative indicators (4.2) is brought to bear on the
role of the RSA criteria in argument-reconstruction (4.3). I offer a particular enrichment
of the majority’s argumentation (5) and briefly indicate its evaluation (5.1). Finally, the
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notion of sound argument is discussed with respect to a sense in which the RSA criteria
substitute for it (6).
The main thesis is conditional and rather weak: If the RSA criteria are substitutes,
then—next to ‘premise-truth’ and ‘validity’—they also substitute ‘reconstructive charity.’
2. THE COMPROMISE ON HESC RESEARCH IN GERMANY
Up to 2002, public and parliamentary debate in Germany had not resulted in a consensus
on the permissibility of hESCR. To the present day, a Rawlsian reflective equilibrium
remains absent, and the legal status quo on hESCR debated.
The German embryo protection law (Embryonenschutzgesetz) 1990 prohibited the
in vitro fertilization and, a fortiori, the frozen-state suspension of development (read:
production and storing) of excorporeal embryos for purposes other than artificially induced pregnancy. Therefore, by prior law (lex anterior), the derivation of stem-cells from
said fertilized pro-nuclei was illegal. However, the import and use of such cells remained
otherwise unregulated. 1
In June 2002, the German parliament adopted a compromise between the
diverging positions of the national debate. Then backed by a large majority, the
compromise has since been honoured for bringing peace (Befriedung) to the issue and,
without irony, is said to have been conceived in a “glorious hour” (“Sternstunde”) of the
Bundestag. Other MPs considered it a dead-birth. Beckmann (2004) summarizes it as
follows:
The stem cell act [in its 2002 version; F.Z.] permits the importing and research use of hESC under
certain conditions, namely if 1) there is scientific evidence that the research concerned serves
“high-priority research goals either in an area of fundamental research (“Grundlagenforschung”)
or in the enlargement of medical knowledge of diagnostic, preventive, or therapeutic procedures in
human medicine” (principle of high priority) (article 5, section 1), and 2) such research, having
already been attempted as far as possible in vitro and in vivo in the animal model, can be advanced
only by using embryonic stem cells (principle of absence of alternatives) (article 5, section 2 a/b).
Only if these two principles are respected may a research project be qualified as “ethically
admissible” (article 6, section 4/2). If it is so qualified, hESC may be imported and used for
research provided 1) they were derived from embryos created for reproductive purposes by in vitro
fertilization and left over (“supernumerous”) for reasons related not to themselves but to the donor,
2) they have been freely given by their parents for research purposes without honorarium or other
benefit, and 3) they were derived from embryos before January 1, 2002 (so as to ensure that these
embryos were not killed for the purpose of exporting their stem cells to Germany). (Beckmann
2004, p. 609)

The above three conditions—high-priority research, absence of alternatives, derivation
prior to 2002—can be viewed as the result of a political process which aimed at a balance
of interests (Interessenausgleich).

1

As no law applied, the deed could not be a criminal act (nullum crimen sine lege), cf. Stark (2007, p.
641ff). According to the predominant legal interpretation, the stem cell law “only” protects an embryo’s
stem cells when imported, thus strengthens the protection afforded by the embryo protection law. E.g., this
stance was adopted by Merkel in the Committee on Education, Research and Appraisal of the
Consequences of Technology (CERACT 2008) in March and presented as the majority interpretation to the
Bundestag in April 2008. Cf. Merkel (2002, 2007).
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3. THE LAST OPINION OF THE GERMAN NATIONAL ETHICS COUNCIL
Throughout its term, the German National Ethics Council (Deutscher Nationaler
Ethikrat) 2 published twelve opinions; the first (2001) and last (NEC 2007) treat hESCR.
Not bound to unanimous recommendations, the council was intended to represent not the
distribution, but the range of ethical opinion in Germany. Consequently, argumentation
and recommendations set forth in its opinion can count as representative artifacts of the
debate. 3
With a view to initiating a new debate, discussion among the council’s members
had started in autumn 2006, also in response to opinions on hESCR forwarded by commissions of the federal states and the German Research Council (DFG 2006). The latter
had lobbied against the stem cell law in the name of the constitutionally granted freedom
of research which the law sought to balance against the obligation to “protect human
dignity and the right to life” (SCL 2002, sect. 1).
In May of 2007, three positions were published as the council’s opinion on a
revision of the cut-off date. It explicitly attempted to answer the question:
[W]hether the emerging international trend of stem cell research and the experience so far gained
with the Stem Cell Law constitute reasons for amending the provisions in force since 2002 (NEC
2007, p. 10).

Taking the 2002 compromise as a basis rather than questioning it, the opinion “presents
proposals on how individual provisions of the law can be further developed under
changed conditions” (ibid., italics added).
Clearly mutually exclusive, the three positions agree on the compromise character
of the stem cell law. They diverge with respect to its significance and its consequences.
The positions can be indexed by the policies favoured, reaching (the majority position)
status-quo revision with fourteen votes, the minorities status quo-or-open debate (nine
votes) and status quo update (one vote). The majority lays out its position on 43 pages.
The minority takes nine and six, respectively. The following summarizes these proposals,
starting with the majority:
3.1 Revise the status quo towards wider uses of hESC
Summary: The cut-off date should be replaced by “practical and reliable case-by-case
consideration” (NEC 2007, p. 49), such that the central approval authority created in the
stem cell act
must be satisfied that the production of the relevant cell lines was neither instigated by the [research project-]applicant itself nor otherwise effected by virtue of actions in Germany” (ibid.).

2

Founded in 2001, members had been directly appointed by the federal chancellor. The council formed an
independent, yet heterogeneous expert-group of “up to 25 members, who represent the scientific, medical,
theological, philosophical, social, legal, ecological and economic worlds” (NEC website). Upon having
created a (hitherto absent) legal basis in 2007, this body was superseded by the German Ethics Council
(Deutscher Ethik Rat). Appointed by parliament, the group first met in summer 2008.
3
On the standards of discourse in the NEC, cf. the critical van den Daele (2008), a recent member of the
council.
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Import from universally accessible stem cell banks on a non-profit basis should be allowed, from commercial stem cell banks prohibited. As the derivation of hESC from
embryos in Germany is already prohibited by the Embryo Protection Act,
[t]he Stem Cell Law should merely determine the action to be taken in the event of infringements
of the approval requirements […] [while] the import and use of stem cells should be permissible
not only for research but also for diagnosis and treatment” (ibid). 4

3.2 Either adhere to the status quo or reopen the debate
Summary: The cut-off date should either be retained, the likely marginalization of
German research in this area accepted and resources invested in alternatives, e.g. research
on adult stem cells. Else, the debate on the fundamental normative positions, including
that laid down in the Embryo Protection Act, should be reopened in order to consider
“whether it might not after all be more consistent [!] to use for research the embryos and
fertilized pro-nuclei no longer required for reproductive purposes in Germany, rather than
constantly importing new hES cells from abroad” (NEC 2007, p. 57). 5
3.3 Adhere to the status quo under cut-off updating
Summary: With additional uses constituting a breach of the 2002 compromise and the
case-by case considerations being comparatively less reliable than the unequivocal cutoff date, the addition of further permitted uses for hES cells not only violates the 2002
compromise. It is also unclear if a majority for liberalization would be forthcoming. Next
to currently funding hES cells research elsewhere through German EU contributions, and
although future medical therapy remains uncertain, Germans would in any case profit
eventually, if the “wrong” now done elsewhere lead to therapeutic success. To adhere to
the compromise, “the setting of a later cut-off date, albeit in the past, is the appropriate
means: it is adequate, takes account of the normative principles of the embryo protection
law and conforms to the spirit of the 2002 compromise” (NEC 2007, p. 64). 6
3.4 Structure of the Majority Opinion
Section I of the document declares that the opinion will only pertain to the stem cell law,
but not the embryo protection law: One does not aim at reopening the debate.
Section II states the object of legal protection (1), summarizes the position of the
Embryo Protection Act as a premise (2), argues for the permissibility of revising the stem
cell act by re-balancing objects of legal protection against each other (3), reminds that no
categorical ban on profiting from “wrongful acts” in other countries has been laid down
4

Signed by: Wolfgang van den Daele, Horst Dreier, Detlev Ganten, Volker Gerhardt, Martin J. Lohse,
Christiane Nüsslein-Volhard, Peter Propping, Jens Reich, Jürgen Schmude, Bettina Schöne-Seifert, Richard
Schröder, Jochen Taupitz, Kristiane Weber-Hassemer, Christiane Woopen.
5
Signed by: Eve-Marie Engels, Regine Kollek, Christiane Lohkamp, Anton Losinger, Eckhard Nagel,
Therese Neuer-Miebach, Peter Radtke, Eberhard Schockenhoff, Spiros Simitis, of which three signed a
supplementary position statement favoring to uphold the status quo (A.L., P.R., E.S).
6
Signed by Hermann Bart.
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in the stem cell act (4), and stresses that hES cells are not to be used for arbitrary
purposes (5), then draws interim conclusions (6).
Section III lays out future prospects for hESC research (1), reminds of the
disadvantages at which German research is placed by the cut-off date (2) and of the
obstacles which the law’s criminal provisions bring about for international co-operations
that involve German researchers (3), finds the permissible uses of hESC research overly
restrictive (4) and claims freedom of research be violated through the stem cell law (5).
Section IV presents alternatives to the cut-off date measure (1), suggests
provisions for additional permitted uses (2), and discusses if penal provision could be
amended or repealed (3).
Section V, finally, presents the recommendations of the majority (see 3.1).
3.5 Nothing new, except…
Importantly, sections I, III and IV do not offer information or argumentation going
beyond the state of the debate up to 2002. Section III (2) contains the only premise that
could provide grounds for re-evaluating the 2002 compromise, as it pertains to new
information.
[T]he majority of the worldwide publications up to 2005 involved research with hES cells […].
[I]t must be deemed a worrying sign that, while applications for work with hES cells have
increased worldwide, no new application has so far been submitted in Germany in 2007. Whether
this situation reflects the concerned diagnosis of “stagnation” described in the Stem Cell
Committee’s latest activity report will perhaps only become fully clear from further developments.
What is, however, certain is that the new hES cell lines developed in the last few years must not be
imported and used in Germany because they do not conform to the cut-off date criterion. Yet
precisely these cell lines are currently being used in experimental research in other countries; their
use will eventually define what is regarded at international level as top-ranking, relevant hES cell research. Germany is excluded from the use of these stem cell lines by the cut-off date criterion. (NEC
2007, p. 31)

To a large extent, the above is the argumentation of the German Research Council (DFG
2006) in favor of a revision of the law: hES cells derived before 2002 were claimed to be
of insufficient quality for research. 7 During a meeting of the Committee on Education,
Research and Appraisal of the Consequences of Technology in March 2008 (CERAT
2008), Hans R. Schöler (Max Planck Institute for Molecular Biomedicine) put it as
follows:
I believe that, since 2002, there are new scientific reasons to import new cell lines: Back then, we
did not at all know how bad the cells were. Possibly, they are even worse now. For me, however, it
is decisive that they were already bad then, but that we did not know it. (CERACT 2008, p. 10,
italics added, my translation). 8

Like the majority opinion, he grounds his position in the availability of a new premise.
7

The DFG (2006) went farther, arguing that even if researchers only worked with adult stem cells, newer
hESC lines are still required as a “gold-standard” to assess if adult cells are “equally [!] toti-potent.”
8
“Ich finde, es gibt seit 2002 neue wissenschaftliche Gründe, um neue Stammzelllinien zu importieren: Wir
wussten damals gar nicht, wie schlecht die Zellen waren. Sie sind jetzt möglicherweise noch schlechter. Für
mich ist aber entscheidend, dass sie damals schon schlecht waren, wir das nur nicht wussten“.

5

FRANK ZENKER

3.6 Implications for evaluation
To substantially evaluate the recommendations forwarded by the majority is therefore a
posterior task. The prior task consists in establishing that it is possible to respect the new
premise without questioning either the stem cell law or the embryo protection law. This
task is shouldered exclusively in section II (3) of the opinion, whence attention can be
restricted to the argumentation there forwarded. 9 In section 5.2, we sketch such an
evaluation.
4. RECONSTRUCTION OF A KEY SEGMENT
The following text constitutes section II (3) of the NEC’s (2007) opinion. Comprising
five paragraphs, we structure the text by adding letters at paragraph- and numbers at sentence-level, then reconstruct each paragraph. Argumentative indicators are italicized.
In section 5, below, we seek to demonstrate that argument-reconstruction for paragraphs E and, especially, for D is by far more problematic than we make it appear here.
The following is an enriched reconstruction of the text. We will problematize this
reconstruction in sections 4.3 and 5.1. There, the guiding question is: By what criteria of
good argumentation has this reconstruction been arrived at?
4.1 Section II(3) of the NEC’s Opinion
Paragraphs A, B and C are, strictly speaking, preparatory steps for the majority’s argumentation in paragraphs D and E. Paragraph A states constraints under which the
majority seeks to establish its position. Paragraph B as well as the first and second
sentence of paragraph C render the difference of opinion between parties. This is
undisputed material which serves to lead up to the argumentation in paragraphs D and E.
A “pure” version of the text is found in the appendix. The reader may wish to refer
to it before reading on, to reach an assessment of the text which is independent of what
will be said below (especially for paragraph D).
4.1.1 Paragraph A
Permissibility of balancing objects of legal protection against each other
(A1) If the compromise of the Stem Cell Law is accepted as the starting point and foundation of
evaluation, it follows that, in the regulation of the import and use of hES cells, on the one hand the
embryo protection criteria must not be set below the level provided for in the Stem Cell Law, and,
on the other, research must not be subjected to restrictions that would have the effect of
completely precluding the use of hES cells. (2) Nor must the interest of the sick in the
development of new therapies be disregarded. (3) However, differences of opinion exist as to the
consequences of these premises for the detailed provisions.

9

This is not the only way of evaluating the argumentation, but it is feasible on pains of otherwise having to
evaluate, e.g., if younger HES cells are indeed required for research in Germany? Not only is the answer to
this question debated, answering it also clearly transcends the resources of argument evaluation.
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(A1) names three conditions which, given the compromise is accepted, must be fulfilled:
the regulation on hES-cell import is not to be set below the Stem Cell law, nor their use to
be precluded or, as (A2) adds, therapy interest to be disregarded. (A3) suggests that disagreement pertains to specific consequences of these conditions, i.e., to the sociotechnological means of fulfilling them, but also to general considerations (the use of
‘consequences’ is vague).
4.1.2 Paragraph B
(B1) To begin with, no one disputes that any system intended to be compatible with the
compromise of the Stem Cell Law must retain the objective of preventing any German causal
contribution to the destruction of embryos in other countries. (2) For this reason, the production of
hES cells abroad must not be “instigated” from Germany—that is to say, it must not, by any action
in Germany, be carried on, commissioned or facilitated by incentives.

(B1) claims that the difference of opinion does not pertain to retaining the objective of
providing no instigation (causal contribution) to hES cell production abroad. (B2)
explicates this objective by characterizing actions which, in accordance, are prohibited.
4.1.3 Paragraph C
(C1) However, opinions differ on whether the compromise represented by the Stem Cell Law is
departed from if alternatives to the present cut-off date criterion or threat of penal sanctions are
considered. (2) Some hold that these two provisions do not in themselves constitute the objective
and purpose of the Stem Cell Law, but are simply means of achieving its objectives and purposes.
(3) The cut-off date criterion is intended, as provided in Section 1 No. 2 of the Stem Cell Law, to
prevent the derivation of hES cells from being instigated as a result of action in Germany, whereas
the criminalization provision has the aim of ensuring that the conditions for approval are observed.
(4) In the opinion of others, the cut-off date criterion is one of the essential ends of the Stem Cell
Law. In their view, the compromise achieved in the Law would no longer be respected if the cutoff date were to be modified or replaced. [end. p. 15].

(C1) states the difference of opinion to pertain to the compatibility of changing measures
and remaining within the boundaries of the 2001 compromise, citing the two measures
which are in place since the compromise (cut of date and penal sanctions). (C2) presents
the standpoint of the pro-side, namely: the two measures are means of the law. (B3)
supports the pro-position by quoting the stem cell law, and the action-guiding (rather than
deterring) character of the penal sanctions. (C4) presents the standpoint of the opponent
(the con-side) as the claim: The two measures are ends of the law whence, as (C5) adds, a
change of measures is incompatible with the compromise.
4.1.4 Paragraph D
(D1) This position is no doubt underlain by the assumption that the risk of the production of hES
cells being “instigated” by action in Germany would be increased in the event of a departure from
the present criterion of a fixed cut-off date. (2) In this connection, however, it is not enough to
maintain that concessions on the cut-off date might in effect be perceived as a signal of symbolic
support for researchers who produce hES cells in other countries. (3) Symbolic reinforcement of
this kind cannot validly be adduced as an instance of the “instigation” of the production of hES
cells within the meaning of the Stem Cell Law. (4) Experience has shown that it cannot be
assumed that such an incentive would automatically arise if the current cut-off date criterion were
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dropped because this would create the abstract possibility of using the new cell lines in Germany
as well as abroad. (5) The development of new cell lines in other countries is part of a dynamic
that proceeds without regard to what is happening in German research. (6) Rather than speculating
on a conceivable demand for hES cells in Germany, scientists are in fact pursuing perceived
research goals, strategies and opportunities. (7) The fixed cut-off date criterion surely has the sole
function of reliably precluding any concrete instigation of the production of new hES cell lines in
other countries. (8) Conversely, with regard to the extent to which new hES cell lines are produced
abroad—apart from the conceivable case of such instigation—it is immaterial whether or not the
cut-off date criterion is retained in Germany. (9) For this reason, the indispensability or otherwise
of the cut-off date criterion depends on the possible existence of regulatory alternatives capable of
equally reliably precluding the concrete instigation, by means of action in Germany, of the
production of hES cell lines in other countries.

In (D1), the con-side is claimed to be supported and motivated by the reasoning: If
measures are changed, then instigation risk increases. This being supported by the stem
cell law is doubted in (D2). The claim is raised, in D3, that one cannot sufficiently
support this reasoning by citing only an increase in abstract instigation risk, since the
Stem Cell law’s prohibition of instigation does not cover abstract instigation. Why not?
(D4) answers: Increasing abstract instigation is not from experience known to be a causal
factor in the derivation of hES cells. Why not? (D5) and (D6) “explain” the absence of
knowledge cited in (D4) by the causal independence of abstract instigation and (concrete)
derivation of hES-cells. (D7) states that, therefore, the cut-off date measure can only be
seen to serve the function of precluding concrete instigation, i.e., causally effective
instigation of the derivation of hES cells abroad. (D8) applies the foregoing to the cut-off
measure, concluding that the cut-off date measure is not causally connected to the
production of hES cells abroad, but only to the instigation of such production. Finally,
(D9) states the dispensability of the cut-off date measure to therefore depend only on its
being replaceable by equally reliable and equally effective regulatory alternatives.
4.1.5 Paragraph E
(E1) However, the legislative history of the Stem Cell Law suggests that it was actually only the
strict cut-off date criterion and the symbolic signal to society of the threat of a severe penalty that
persuaded some deputies to vote for the bill. (2) Perhaps these provisions did in this way make
some contribution to achieving “peace” in the dispute about the import and use of [end p. 16]
embryonic stem cells. (3) It may nevertheless be doubted that the strict cut-off date criterion is an
integral component of the compromise defined in the Stem Cell Law. (4) An argument against this
idea is that eventually no one in Germany would any longer be able to take part in research with
hES cells on the level of international science if the cut-off date really were set in stone (on this
point, see Section III.2 below). (5) The Stem Cell Law would then not be a compromise, but
simply a deferred complete abandonment of the import and use of hES cells. (6) Such an
interpretation can surely not be reconciled with the other declared objective of the Law—that of
ensuring the freedom of research. (7) If the compromise character of the Stem Cell Law is taken
seriously, the cut-off date criterion cannot be deemed indispensable. (8) This is also implicitly
conceded by those who oppose changes to the cut-off date criterion by arguing that science does
not in fact need the new cell lines. (9) Anyone who rejects a change in the cut-off date criterion on
the grounds that it is not necessary at least does not rule out the possibility of the criterion being
modified if this is necessary. [end of section, p. 17]

(E1) concedes that both the cut-off date and the penal sanctions were indispensable in
moving some deputies towards the compromise. In (E2), a peace-conduciveness
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interpretation for this legislative historical fact is offered, though the ‘perhaps’ turns (E2)
into a hypothesis. It can be seen as the strongest hypothesis consistent with (E3), which
claims, it can be doubtable that the cut-off date is an integral compromise part. Why
doubtable? In support of (E3), (E4) and (E5) together make the claim that, were it
otherwise, the compromise character of the stem cell law would be lost; the law then took
on the character of a delayed complete abandonment of hESCR in Germany. Hence, as
(E6) states, freedom of research can longer be seen to be respected. (E7) construes an
incompatibility between upholding the compromise character under the indispensability
interpretation of the cut-off date and upholding freedom of research. In (E8) support for
this incompatibility view is located amongst those who oppose changing the cut off date
measure on the grounds that newer cells are not necessary, because, as (E8) states, this
position does not preclude changing the measure if necessary.
4.2 An oddity with respect to argumentative indicators
It will have been observed that the number of argumentative indicators is surprisingly
low. In particular, paragraphs D and E—which I take to be the crucial sections of the
entire opinion—feature only two and three indicators, respectively (however,
nevertheless, perhaps, for this reason, an argument against this idea is). Insofar as these
paragraphs indeed contain the central argument for the majority position, it should be
theoretically interesting (and perhaps surprising) to note that the number of indicators
correlates inversely with importance.
4.3 What is the argument here?
As argumentative indicators are largely missing, we are challenged with respect to
justifying our reconstruction of the text. At face value, going through paragraph D leaves
one with a series of sentences (speech-act theoretically: assertives) for which it is not at
all clear in what manner they confer support upon a conclusion. The support relations
between sentences are largely not part of the text, but need to be reconstructed.
We single out paragraph D, because it serves particularly well to compare a traditional
(deductive) reconstruction which is based on the (near) truth of premises and the logical
validity of the argument schema with a reconstruction guided by assuming that premises
must be acceptable, relevant and sufficient for the paragraph’s conclusion. We do so in
the light of the following explication from van Eemeren (2002) of the well known
Informal Logic criteria.
In the case of ‘relevance’ the question is whether there is an is adequate (substantial) relation
between the premises and the conclusion of an argument; in the case of ‘sufficiency’ the question
is whether the premises provide enough evidence for the conclusion; in the case of ‘acceptability’
the question is whether the premises themselves are true, probable or in some other way
trustworthy. None of the three criteria has been more clearly defined. (van Eemeren 2002, section
3.2)

Rather than give improved definitions, we seek to demonstrate that the criteria already
got us to a point where their superiority vis a vis considerations of premise truth and
validity is apparant. Implications for the traditional conception of sound argument will be
discussed below.
9
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5. RECONSTRUCTING PARAGRAPH D
(D1) is part of locating the difference of opinion. (D2) is a straightforward claim for
which one expects support in the immediate vicinity. (D3) does provide support for (D2),
but is itself in need of further support. Does (D4) provide support for (D3)? I take it, for
(D4) to (D8), it is less than obvious what they support. After all, we have no overt
argumentative indicators to go on. Only (D9), using “for this reason,” is explicitly related
to the sentence(s) preceding it.
Stated briefly, when reading these sentences individually or as a group, it remains
unclear what the argumentative structure of paragraph D, especially (D4) to (D8),
amounts to. I had offered one such structure in the reconstruction above. This structure
was rather not forced by the text. It resulted from an effort to keep the sentences relevant
to the conclusion in (D9). 10
E.g., (D4), when read to stand in direct support of (D3), would come out as
irrelevant—not only initially, also upon reflection. The same can be said of (D5) and
(D6). If so, the problem arising is that (D7), which is crucial for the majority’s standpoint,
stands amidst sentences which turn out to be irrelevant, although, colloquially speaking,
they “look true.” Moreover, when evaluated on the (near-)truth criterion, then (D7), by
repeating what is to be argued for, would be analyzed as an instance of begging the
question (cf. Ritola 2003)
Going carefully through this paragraph, the reader will confirm that her understanding of it is reached by having provided for it a structure which the text supports,
perhaps even strongly suggests (to you), but—and this is the point to make—does not
openly present.
None of the premises are in any good sense unacceptable. Yet, judging their
acceptability is not enough. In order to satisfy the sufficiency criterion—or so I shall
argue –, we have to complete the reasoning by making explicit the relations of relevance
between what is overtly stated and at least one unexpressed premise.
It pertains to
the interim conclusion in (D7).
This conclusion—or so I claim—is not sufficiently supported by the forgoing
reasons (D4) to (D6). On the reconstruction offered here, (D4) to (D6) are descriptions
intended to capture the de facto causal relations between a measure and the end which
this measures is intended to serve. We thus deal with the causal nexus between hES-cell
production outside of Germany and abstract instigation of such production by measures
taken in Germany.
The claim raised in the text is: There is no such causal connection.11 So, (D8)
states the empirical aspect of this matter (cut-off date is immaterial for the extent to
which new hES-cells are produced), while (D7) states the legal aspect with respect to the
function intended by the cut-off date measures (the cut-off date cannot be seen 12 to have
10

We thus find that relevance is a criterion which pertains to argument reconstruction, see section 6, below.
Cf. NEC (2007, p. 41): “The assumed overall causal relationship is […] a fiction and can for that reason
not suffice to justify an appreciable restriction of the freedom of research.”
12
The German original reads “Man wird die Funktion der festen Stichtagsregelung nur darin sehen können,
jede konkrete Veranlassung der Herstellung von neuen HES-Zelllinien im Ausland sicher auszuschließen“
(DER 2007:11). The English translation renders „man wird nur können“ by using the term “surely,”
suggesting that something is largely (perhaps completely) beyond doubt. Even choosing ‘completely
11
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any other function than reliably precluding concrete instigating of hES cell production be
Germany).
The item by which (D4) to (D7) can confer sufficient support upon (D8), I submit,
is a variation on the legal principle of proportionality. Applied to this case, it can be
stated as:
(PP)

A measure M employed with intent I (i.e., to achieve function F) is not
permissible, if a less drastic and available measure M* already achieves F.

The majority appealed to this principle when arguing for the permissibility of restricting
freedom of research (NEC 2007, p. 40). In analogy, one may formulate the reasoning that
yields (PP) in order to relate not the functional measure to its permissible corresponding
legal intent, but the sensible legal intent to the measure’s function:
(PP’) For a given measure, M, employing it with intent I’ (i.e., to achieve function F’) is
non-sensical, if the particular measure is causally impotent with respect to F.’
If a change in measures would only lead to a risk increase with respect to abstract
instigation, and abstract instigation is irrelevant for, because not causally connected to
embryo-derivation abroad, then the stem cell law cannot (sensibly) intend to preclude abstract instigation.
Hence, (D7) is forwarded—cf. the use of ‘consequence’ in paragraph A—as the
correct legal consequence of the experiences stated in (D4) to (D6). Thus, (D7) supports
the thesis that, given the proportionality principle (PP’), the stem cell act could only have
been intended—therefore “can only be seen”—to preclude acts of concrete instigation,
not of abstract instigation, because symbolic reinforcement, i.e, abstract instigation, is not
experienced to lead to an increased risk in concrete instigation of hES cell production
abroad.
Finally, then, (D4) to (D8) support (D9) which applies the preceding reasoning to
the dispensability of the cut-off date measure, which is claimed to depend—“for this
reason”—only on being replaceable by equally reliable and equally effective regulatory
alternatives that prevent concrete instigation.
5.1 Brief evaluation
We shall not elaborate on the reconstruction of paragraph E (beyond section 4.1.5), nor
attempt to finally evaluate the argumentation at this point. In passing, however, we can
note: As a counter-argument, if paragraph D is dialectically adequate, then only against
an opponent who regards the cut-off date and the penal sanctions as means of the law, not
ends.
The position of those regarding them as ends is addressed in paragraph E. It
centrally argues on the basis of the semantics of the term ‘compromise,’ thus conceding
beyond doubt,’ however, fails to bring out that the German original is yet stronger. It should read “one will
only be able to.” This use suggests (to me) the implicit invocation of a principled reason which needs to be
reconstructed, precisely because the preceding sentences (D4) to (D6) are not strong enough to sufficiently
support (D7).
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that the counterargument consists in construing an incompatibility between regarding
them as ends and establishing such ends via a compromise.
From the evaluative point of view, the problem of the argumentation in paragraph
E is that the legal commentary to the stem cell law included the following passage:
Article 5 limits research on embryonic research to high-priority research aims. At the same time,
only such projects are permissible whose conduct with alternative methods, according to the
research project’s concretely planned research question, does not allow to expect results of equal
value. In this way, the demand for embryonic stem cells by researchers working in Germany shall
be limited to a minimum. Also the danger of a possibly arising eventual request of a further
relaxation of the legal provision shall thereby be opposed from the outset (German Lower House
of Parliament, printed matter 14/8394: 9; italics added, my translation).

The majority opinion does not explicitly address this part of the law’s commentary.
Without further assumptions, this passage cannot invalidate the majority’s argumentation.
Yet, it shows that, at the time of compromising, the con-party was well aware of the
possibility of an eventual request for relaxing the law.
It is presently unclear to me how one should evaluate the significance of this
passage. I find it reasonable, to regard the majority’s argumentation in paragraph E to be
implicitly directed at the standpoint here expressed. We would then deal with an instance
of pro/con argumentation, one or the other of which can be defeated. In other words, the
2002 anticipatory opposition against eventual relaxation is defeasible by the 2007 compromise-semantic argument or vice versa. If so, the outcome depends on something
beyond argumentation.
Rather than elaborate on this, I would now like to come back to the quality criteria
for argument evaluation.
6. RECONSTRUCTIVE CHARITY
We had seen that paragraph D was in need of a structure of argumentative support by
means of which (D4) to (D6) can be related to (D7) and (D8) which, in turn, support the
conclusion (D9). We reached this structure by attempting to relate the sentences in ways
that would leave them relevant for the argumentation. We added a principle (PP’) in
order to achieve a sufficient support for the conclusion. All premises in paragraph D were
deemed acceptable.
This paragraph was selected to show, in an exemplary manner, that an analysis
which relies exclusively on the traditional epistemological notions of premise truth and
scheme-validity disqualifies itself, because applying these considerations renders
premises irrelevant and one such that it begs the question against the conclusion to be
supported.
On the basis of this paragraph, I suggest, an important insight can be exemplified.
It primarily has to do with the effort that goes into argument reconstruction. The reason
why working with premise truth and schema-validity gets one not too far here (indeed it
sets one out in the direction of the wrong reconstruction) can be stated as follows: The
application of the traditionally epistemological evaluation-criteria presupposes a prior
application of reconstructive charity on the part of the analyst.
Such charity (though not by this term), for example, is known to PragmaDialecticians from having to specify, for a given episode of argumentation, either a
12
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logical minimum or a pragmatic optimum (depending primarily on whether a speaker
overtly claims logical validity for an argument). 13 The general consideration pertains to
analyzing the argumentation in such a way that maximum credit can be given to the
arguer (cf. van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004, 117f., esp. note 32). Thus, there is an
obligation to assume that the arguer is at least as intelligent as the analyst.14
The Informal Logic criteria (relevance, sufficiency, acceptability), which have
been described “as replacements for the […] logico-epistemological criterion of
‘soundness’” (Blair 2007, p. 34), can thus be seen to replace at any rate more than only
premise truth and scheme validity (together making up soundness).
After all, as was shown above, approaching a text only with the latter two criteria
can demonstrably result in partial non-sense. Put differently: The presumed skill,
intelligence and experience on the part of the arguer (here: a member of an expert body)
is pragmatically inconsistent with reconstructing irrelevant premises and question
begging ones (cf. Blair 2007, p. 38). 15 This, it seems to me, is the insight that both
Pragma-Dialectics and Informal Logic correctly capitalize on when rejecting the
argument form ‘p, therefore p’ as uninformative (cf. Blair ibid., van Eemeren and
Grootendorst 2004, p. 3, note 8).
Conversely, then, the traditional logico-epistemological criteria fail to explicate a
crucial precondition of their application, namely having reached a charitable
reconstruction. Such reconstructions retrace support relations and add premises (like our
principle PP,’ above) which transform the text into parts that, taken together, constitute a
sound argument, while avoiding the otherwise ensuing non-informativeness of a logical
reconstruction.
The relevance criterion, then, is most susceptible to be the substitute of what the
logico-epistemological approach would call charity. After all, the norm of reconstructive
charity will demand amendments to the argument’s explicit textual form such that it
satisfies the relevance-criterion. At any rate, it is in this sense that one may most
charitably understand Blair (2007, p. 38f.) who writes: “[T]he relevance ‘criterion’ is in
the first place a criterion of inclusion in the analysis and reconstruction of arguments
from discourse.”
On this note, it might be tempted to regard the validity of the argument scheme to
correspond to the sufficiency-criterion, and acceptability to the true-premise criterion.
Appealing as this simple projection appears, however, it is likely too simplistic.
7. CONCLUSION
Based on a particular example of real-life public policy argumentation, it was argued that
the Informal Logic criteria of relevance, sufficiency, and acceptability (RSA) do not
function only as evaluative criteria, but—at least as far as relevance is concerned—as
criteria that also guide argumentative reconstruction.
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In distinction to prior versions of the Pragma-Dialectical theory, I have briefly discussed this in Zenker
(2007).
14
One (perhaps unavoidable) problem with current textbook treatments is that their “canned and simplistic”
(Johnson 2007, p. 82) examples seem to be chosen in such a way that his norm is violated.
15
It is not, however, incompatible with producing an argument that can be objected to.
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As for the Informal Logic position’s being explicitly distanced to traditional
logico-epistemological notions, the RSA criteria should not be seen to replace only
soundness (true premises plus valid inference scheme), but soundness and reconstructive
charity. The latter was identified as ‘always already presupposed’ when applying the
soundness-criterion.
Consequently, proponents of the traditional logico-epistemological approach to
argumentation who defending them against later developments should be seen to presuppose reconstructive charity, and, in turn, would do well to explicate charity next to
soundness.
Link to appendix

Link to commentary
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